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The most recent topic on the discussion of Deleuze’s philosophy is nothing more than the question of “life.” It seems to be an unquestionable fact that Deleuze has already developed a sort of philosophy of life in his later period that is well elaborated in his essay “Immanence: A Life…” Some readers argue for a kind of Deleuze’s philosophy of life by integrating “the concept of life” and the idea of vitalism. Vitalism has become a sound idea which is widely applied to all kinds of discussions about Deleuze on the question of life. On the contrary, other critics argue against it: we should be careful of the use of vitalism when it comes to the ethical and political debates of bio-politics or the politics of life. They think that it might misconceive the concept of life in Deleuze’s philosophy. Is there really such a thing as a philosophy of life or an ontology of life in Deleuze’s philosophy? What does Deleuze want to claim about life? Above all, these questions would be helpful to us if we want to clarify the question of life in Deleuze’s philosophy. In doing so, I am going to situate the question of life at the context of Deleuze’s early study of Bergson’s concept of élan vital, so to speak, Deleuze’s question of life is to work and to rework the Bergsonian concept of life in a new way. My question is: what is the significance in Deleuze’s revival of Bergson’s élan vital? 

A. The Bergsonian Critical Philosophy

Let me begin by asking a question “what is life according to Bergson?” Life for Bergson is put in a status of a problem. That is about stating the problem rather than making the false problem. The false problem is a ready-made problem whether its answer is true or false, which is determined by either the possibility or impossibility of giving its solution (B 17). Discerning the truth or falsity of a problem is a key point to interpret Bergson’s philosophy, because the root of the problem has been found in life itself, “Life is essentially determined in the act of avoiding obstacles, stating and solving a problem. The construction of the organism is both the stating of a problem and a solution” (B 16). In this regard, Bergson explains in Creative Evolution (1907) that the divergent form of life is conceived of a solution to the problem of the life itself, “so our study of the evolution movement will have to unravel a certain number of divergent directions, and to appreciate the importance of what has happened along each of them – in a word, to determine the nature of the dissociated tendencies and estimate their relative proportion” (CE 101). In accordance with tendencies, for example, both vegetables and animals are defined and distinguished as two divergent forms of life, which is the solution of alimentation to the problem of maintaining life (CE 106).

In light of this argument, life as a problem to be stated and to be solved it implies that the evolution of life has something to do with the knowledge of life. There is a relation that exists between life and reason. Life does not refer to an irrational power or mystical force and reason is not cut off from life. Both life and knowledge should not be opposite to one another. On the one hand, for the theory of life, a criticism of knowledge is needed because the understanding or the intellect encloses the facts in pre-existing structures that could never be seen as the ultimate one, since the frames of intellect are only a kind of symbolism but not a direct vision of its object. On the other hand, for the theory of knowledge, by means of placing the intellect in the problem of the evolution of life, we could know how the frames of knowledge have been constituted and how we can overcome their limitations. It is necessary that both these theory of knowledge and theory of life should join together and should be critical to each other in order to explore the problem of life (CE xiii).

With this Bergsonian insight, Deleuze goes on to emphasize the importance of stating problems as the true focus of thought, even as an ethical demand of thought; which is to struggle against the illusion that is the spatial mode of thinking of time. In other words, “this illusion is inevitable as soon as we spatialize time,” or that “the confusion of space and time, the assimilation of time into space, make us think that the whole is given” (B 104). Illusion comes along with false problems. Then thinking would be distorted as a way leading us towards asking the ready-made question and giving the pre-given solutions. In order to overcome the illusion, Deleuze calls us to get rid of the infantile state, that is “the master sets a problem, our task is to solve it, and the result is accredited true or false by a powerful authority” (DR 158). The freedom to struggle against this infantile state relies on a sort of capacity to make a distinction between the true and the false problem: Intuition. Intuition is the method of division. It is a thinking in duration (B 31); to state problems and to solve them in terms of time but not of space. The method of intuition “decides between the true and the false in the problems that are stated” (B 21). The intuition moves the intelligence to turn over against itself, because we are led by the intelligence to only see “differences in degree where there are differences in kind” (B 21). It is intuition that discerns what the real difference in kind is. By contrast, through intuition, we can derive another tendency which is the critical one from the intelligence to react against this intellectual tendency. 

B. Bergson on the Élan Vital

According to Deleuze, Bergson’s question of life brings about the concept of difference through which it redefines the relation between dualism and monism. Deleuze explains that dualism for Bergson is “only a moment, which must lead to the re-formation of a monism” (B 29). How does Bergson demonstrate the reformation of monism by the moment of dualism? As Deleuze says, “Differences in degree are the lowest degree of Difference; differences in kind (nature) are the highest nature of Difference. There is no longer any dualism between nature and degrees. All the degrees coexist in a single Nature that is expressed, on the one hand, in differences in kind, and on the other, in differences in degree. This is the moment of monism: All the degrees coexist in a single Time, which is nature in itself. There is no contradiction between this monism and dualism, as moments of the method” (B 93). Deleuze moves further to explain that all the degrees and all the levels that coexist and unify in the moment of monism is the virtual. Monism is completed by means of the virtual. What is the notion of virtual? In order to answer this question, Deleuze turns to Bergson’s concept of élan vital. 

In fact, the élan vital is conceived as a sort of critique of evolutionism that distinguishes Bergson’s theory of life from the other theories of evolution either Darwinian mechanism or Lamarckian finalism. Bergson criticizes these two theories of evolution for stating that everything is given and nothing is invented. These theories follow the analytical view (isolated / separated / not holistic / representational) to explain the evolution of life. Life is objectified as an object of science. But it finally tells us that the intellect is inadequate to know anything about life. By contrast, Bergson argues that life is something to be known beyond the range of science and intelligence. He proposes to develop the new theories of life and knowledge by introducing the method of intuition to explore the élan vital. For Bergson, the élan vital is defined as “an original impetus of life”; or the motor of life, the explosive force of life. Put it simply, it is the origin of life in terms of its unity and diversity; its variations in the continual divergence of evolution, its actualizations of virtualities; its encounters and confrontation with matter; its failures and successes of getting over obstacles, and its creative force of the novelty in the multiple form of the living beings. 

To be precise, the élan vital, in Bergson’s word, is an impetus, for being “sustained right along the lines of evolution among which it gets divided, is the fundamental cause of variations, at least of those that are regularly passed on, that accumulate and create new species” (CE 57). First, the élan vital is given as an interpretative principle in a non-reductive view for the variations of all living beings. It is this vital impetus to explain how the divergence of life takes place in evolution; “when species have begun to diverge from a common stock, they accentuate their divergence as they progress in their evolution” (CE 57). Bergson tries to overcome the “anthropomorphic character” of both mechanism and finalism by going through the proceeding of élan vital. He rejects the resemblance of nature to humankind as if “nature has worked like a human being by bringing parts together” (CE 58). By contrast, “Life does not proceed by the association and addition of elements, but by dissociation and division” (CE 58). Second, the élan vital is a tendency of divergence, is an internal explosive force that is generated from itself. “For life is tendency, and the essence of a tendency is to develop in the form of a sheaf, creating, by its very growth, divergent directions among which its impetus is divided” (CE 65). Life is “a tendency to act on inert matter. The direction of this action is not pre-determined; hence the unforeseeable variety of forms which life, in evolving, sows along its path.” In this regard, the tendency of life in evolution is not to act on a plan according to something already determined. But it is presented with “the character of contingency” which refers to “a rudiment of choice” (CE 62). Third, élan vital is an image in connection with matter. It is an image given to think creative evolution. Bergson insists that life “must be compared to an impetus, because no image borrowed from the physical world can give more nearly the idea of it. But it is only an image” (CE 257). By using the image of impetus, Bergson can explore the temporal character of life to have a contact with matter. Finally, the élan vital is a notion concerning time that is duration. It is duration that becomes the élan vital and that differentiates itself. The élan vital is an impetus that accounts for the time of evolution in its actualization of virtualities. Life is a movement in terms of duration.

C. Élan Vital and the Virtual

The élan vital is a vitality of life. It is the élan vital that defines Bergson’s philosophy as a philosophy of difference because it is only the concept of difference that discloses the significance of élan vital. Deleuze proclaims that “Bergsonism is a philosophy of difference, a philosophy of the actualization of difference: in it we meet difference in person, which actualizes itself as the new” (BCD 51). According to Deleuze, “Biology shows us the process of differentiation at work. We are looking for a concept of difference that does not allow itself to be reduced to degree or intensity, to alterity or contradiction: such a difference is vital, even if the concept itself is not biological. Life is the process of difference” (BCD 39). In this case, Bergson is thinking the differentiation of species that is evolution. The difference which is generated from the élan vital is the vital difference in evolution which is against the reduction of itself to other things. It is the original difference in itself.   

Why should Deleuze emphasize that difference is vital difference? In my view, Deleuze wants to show how Bergson explores the internal difference by the biological difference. Bergson finds that we are able to divide the composites or mixtures into two tendencies of matter and duration. Duration differs from itself but not from other thing else but matter does not differ from itself but only repeats itself. In this case, it is no longer to indicate that there are two tendencies that they are different in nature but rather defines the difference of nature as one of these two tendencies. Therefore, the external difference turns out to be the internal difference because difference of nature has turned out to be a nature. Deleuze points out that the internal difference must be made different from contradiction or negation, such as the dialectics of Plato and Hegel; because their dialectics come from the power of negative. Rather, Bergson intends to search for the concept of difference without the negation and it does not contain the negative at all (BCD 42). That is the internal difference which gives us the power of differentiation without negation. The internal difference is the vital difference which is involved in duration that contains the notion of virtual. To put it simply, vital is virtual. In Deleuze’s words, the élan vital “is always a case of a virtuality in the process of being actualized, a simplicity in the process of differentiating, a totality in the process of dividing up: Proceeding ‘by dissociation and division,’ by ‘dichotomy,’ is the essence of life” (B 94). For example, life is divided into plant and animal; and then animal is divided into instinct and intelligence; and also the instinct is divided into different directions to be actualized in different species while the intelligence works out the same division. The élan vital consists of the actual and the virtual altogether. And then both the actual and the virtual constitute the élan vital as the process of differentiation. It is differentiation that distinguishes difference from determination. Difference as differentiation is indetermination but not determination. It is unforeseeable and not accidental but it is essential and the negation of accidental (BCD 40). To be precise, the process of differentiation is engendered from the power of virtuality. According to Deleuze, differentiation is the actualization of virtuality insofar as “it presupposes a unity, a virtual primordial totality that is dissociated according to the lines of differentiation, but that still shows its subsisting unity and totality in each line” (B 95). 

It seems to be a paradoxical question to us. Does Deleuze refer to the ideal unity that exists for the production and reproduction of different multiplicities? Deleuze mentions that for some biologists there is no clear distinction between the virtual and the possible because they rely on the notion of organic virtuality or potentiality that can be actualized by the simple limitation of its capacity. However, the virtual cannot work out itself by elimination or limitation. Rather, for the purpose of being actualized, the virtual “must create its own lines of actualization in positive acts” (B 97). Creation only happens within the real and along with the real but never with the possible. The virtual is not opposed to the real but it is opposed to the actual as if the possible is opposed to the real. The possible is either realized or not realized according to resemblance in such a way that the real is confined to the image of the possible that it realizes, and also in limitation within which realization repulses some possibles but others can pass through into the real. The virtual is not made to be realized but to be actualized “by being differentiated and is forced to differentiate itself, to create its lines of differentiation in order to be actualized” (B 97). In this case, the actual is free from the image of the possible because of the creative power of the virtual. That is why Deleuze stands for Bergson in such a way that “the possible is a false notion, the source of false problems” (B 98) because the real is defined and made by its resemblance of the possible. The real is no longer subject to the possible insofar as the real is given the priority over the possible. That means, we are resistant to a kind of real which is “ready-made, preformed, pre-existent to itself, and that will pass into existence according to an order of successive limitations. Everything is already completely given: all of the real in the image, in the pseudo-actuality of the possible” (B 98). The real is the real of ready-made or pre-given. It is only the image of the possible. By contrast, “it is not the real that resembles the possible, it is the possible that resembles the real, because it has been abstracted from the real once made” (B 98).

Most importantly, the Bergsonian creative evolution is composed of difference and creation (B 98). Evolution and creation are not opposite to one another. Evolution is coming up from the virtual to the actual. “Evolution is actualization, actualization is creation” (B 98). There are two misconceptions in the theory of biological evolution: either interpreting biological evolution in terms of the “possible” that is “realized” or interpreting it in terms of pure actuals (B 98). In order to counter the evolutionism, Deleuze argues for the three requirements for the Bergsonian philosophy of life (B 99-100): 1) to experience and to think vital difference as internal difference from which the “tendency to change” would not be misconceived as something accidential; and variations are able to meet their internal cause in the tendency as such; 2) variations are not restricted by the relationships of association and addition but they enter into relationships of dissociation and division; 3) there is a virtuality that is actualized according to the lines of divergence; evolution therefore does not take place from one actual term to another actual term in a homogeneous unilinear series, but it comes up from a virtual term to the heterogeneous terms that actualizes it along with the ramified series (B 99-100). Hence, all these requirements have led towards the concept of difference in terms of divergence and heterogeneity. The concept of difference is unfolded in the notion of the virtual, “the virtual as virtual has a reality” (B 100). Difference is produced from the reality of the virtual insofar as the virtuality is actualized, is differentiated, is developed when it actualizes and develops its different parts in accordance with divergent lines. Each of these divergent lines corresponds to a particular degree in the virtual totality (B 100). And then each of these different degrees belongs to a single Time, coexisting in a Unity, and all of them are enclosed in a Simplicity and form the potential parts of a Whole. All of them above all are “the reality of this virtual” (B 100). The élan vital is not the possible but the virtual. Nothing is given in advance in the virtual. The élan vital is the élan virtuel.

D. Matter as the Obstacle of Life

Now we can see that the differences in degree from the virtual totality are presented in each line of the actuals while the opposition between the actual and the other actual is established. They are the fundamental oppositions between plant and animal, between animal and man, in such of these binary pairs that we would have, in each one of them, “the negative of the other, the inversion of the other, or the obstacle that is opposed to the other” (B 101). Bergson gives it a term called “contrariety”: “Matter is presented as the obstacle of life that the élan vital must get around, and materiality, as the inversion of the movement of life” (B 101-102). It seems that, finally, we only see the deteriorations of life: one is set against or is negative to another one. However, the inversion and the obstacle here do not signify any negative meaning of the deterioration. The fault that we always make is to think evolution as a process of negation rather than of creation. Life does not create itself by the power of the negative but through the differentiation of itself following the lines of divergence. 

How do we understand the obstacle of the movement of life without any negative meaning? What is the significance of the élan vital when the movement of life has to stop by encountering the obstacle of matter? Deleuze points out that “there is a correlation between life and matter, between expansion and contraction, which shows the coexistence of their respective degrees in the virtual Whole, and their essential relativity in the process of actualization” (B 103). In fact, each line of life is made in relation to a certain kind of matter, which is an external environment, and also implies that the living being produces a body or a form for itself. In other words, the forms of life rely on the matter on which life embodies itself according to the degree of the élan vital that matter receives or resists it more or less. In this case, the living being exists in the material form for the stating of a problem and the capacity of solving problem (CE 70). As a kind of creativity, life would answer the problems by giving a response to any unpredictable occasions instead of repeating it (CE 58). For example, the construction of an eye is the solution to the problem of light (B 103). Life would not be signified as a problem without the involvement of matter, since life is a tendency to act on matter, to make use of matter. But life would take a risk of a failure when it is related to the movement which invents it. As Deleuze explains, “Life as movement alienates itself in the material form that it creates; by actualizing itself, by differentiating itself, it loses ‘contact with the rest of itself.’ Every species is thus an arrest of movement; it could be said that the living being turns on itself and closes itself” (B 104). Life takes place within the matter but life would alienate itself within the matter as well. Matter is an expression of life but also an external obstacle that life encounters with on its process. Life is placed in the situation of setting against itself in the material form. When life actualizes itself and differentiates itself in the material form, the other parts of life would be lost from the contact with itself in its movement. Although life in the sense of the actual would stop its movement in terms of each species of the living being, and then living being would turn on itself and close itself, at the end, it would not turn out to be a negation of the virtual. 

In fact, matter does not differ from itself but life differs from itself in its differentiation. “Differentiation certainly comes from the resistance life encounters from matter, but it comes first and foremost from the explosive internal force which life carries within itself” (BCD 40). It is through the way of life that virtuality actualizes itself and differentiates itself. “Virtuality exists in such a way that it actualizes itself as it dissociates itself; it must dissociate itself to actualize itself. Differentiation is the movement of a virtuality actualizing itself. Life differs from itself, so we are confronted by divergent lines of evolution and, on each line, original processes” (BCD 40). Difference is vital and virtual. It finally discloses the fact that “this Whole, this One, are pure virtuality” (B 93). Since life cannot develop in other way in the evolution if the Whole is supposed to be only the virtual, it must divide itself by being acted out as the actual. The Whole “cannot assemble its actual parts that remain external to each other: The Whole is never ‘given’” (B 104). If the Whole were given, it would repeat the mistakes of mechanism and finalism: life would become either a calculation in terms of a state or a determination in terms of a program. In order to get rid of this determination, Deleuze points out that “there is no ‘goal’” given to life, although “there is finality because life does not operate without directions” (B 106). These directions are the actualization of vital differences, because they are “not pre-exist ready-made, and are themselves created ‘along with’ the act that runs through them” (B 106). In light of this argument, life is in principle memory, consciousness and freedom; and “in principle” that is to say: virtually. When it comes to the achievement of humanity that duration becomes consciousness of self and life engages in memory and freedom of fact. In other words, “it is only on the line of Man that the élan vital successfully ‘gets through’; man in this sense is ‘the purpose of the entire process of evolution.’ It could be said that in man, and only in man, the actual becomes adequate to the virtual” (B 106).

E. A Revival of Bergson’s élan vital

What is the significance in Deleuze’s revival of Bergson’s élan vital? The aim of Deleuze’s revival of Bergson’s élan vital is a renewal of philosophy by making a return to difference itself or to the things themselves. What does it mean by defining things as differences? Deleuze answers that we have to “determine the differences of nature between things: only in this way will we be able ‘to return’ to the things themselves, to account for them without reducing them to something other than what they are, to grasp them in their being” (BCD 32). We must ask what the things themselves are rather than what they are not. That is not an external difference which is negatively compared to the other things, but it is an internal difference as difference in itself. Difference does not mean negation. It is not a dialectical difference. But what are the things themselves according to Bergson? Things are not the self-sufficient substances, not the unchangeable entity. But things are composites which are composed of two tendencies. Things themselves are the expression of tendencies. It is only by intuition we are able to approach the thing itself: “intuition suggests itself as a method of difference or division: to divide whatever is composite into two tendencies” (BCD 36). Tendencies are always in pairs in a composite. A tendency works out itself when it always comes along with another tendency. For example, life (organic form) is a composite of matter and élan vital. Therefore, the Bergsonian tendencies can be compared to the Nietzschean forces. In both cases, they also have the similar structure.

Tendencies have somehow become forces in Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche. The thing itself for Nietzsche is like the object itself which is an expression of a force: “Forces have quantity, but they also have the quality which corresponds to their difference in quantity: the qualities of force are called active and reactive” (NP 42). Likewise, Nietzsche’s distinction between the reactive and the active is similar to the discernment of two tendencies between the space and time, matter and duration, matter and élan vital. It does not mean that one part should be eliminated by another part. Rather, the two are not equivalent and one tendency predominates over the other one always. Then it is only the dominant tendency that defines the true nature of composites but the other tendency tries to oppose to the dominant one. Bergson’s criticism of spatial thinking has the same effect as Nietzsche’s rejection of the reactive thought by which we only perceive the world in the sense of possibility or not. By contrast, if we think the world in terms of duration, things would come to appear as it is the real in the nature of movement. And the durational thinking is like the active forces that consider transforming power as a status of becoming rather than a thing in an unchanged status. In this case, there is a correlation between Bergson’s actualization of virtuality and Nietzsche’s selection of affirmation.  

This correlation turns us to conclude that Deleuze brings in Bergson’s élan vital and Nietzsche’s eternal return together for the strategic use of arguing against the Hegelian negativity. Both of Bergson’s élan vital and Nietzsche’s eternal return are put concerning the positive thinking which is to approach the internal difference instead of the dialectical difference from the modes of reactive thought or spatial thinking. In Deleuze’s view, it is the will to power to determine the relation of forces to forces by which it makes the eternal return possible. The eternal return becomes a selective principle of affirmation. It selects the active and stronger through the activity of active forces and through the affirmation of strong will. Only the strong returns eternally but the weak must be eliminated. Only the affirmative returns eternally but the negative would be eliminated out of the return finally. The active and stronger force would not negate the reactive and weaker force but rather only would affirm its difference. Hence, in both of these cases, it is the concept of difference to give the meaning that élan vital differentiates itself and the active affirms its difference.

If this is the case, can we say that vitalism is a solution to nihilism? We should not forget that the élan vital is the power or the force of creating novelty. Such the power is prefigured in the Nietzsche’s Overman. The Nietzsche’s Overman is a philosophical persona of Bergson’s élan vital which is actualized in the line of man and the purpose of evolution. The élan vital is provided as an image of thought which is resistant to any kind of pre-existent thought or the dogmatic image of thought which presupposes that the whole is a given like mechanism as the unquestionable ground of the concept of life. By the same token, the Nietzsche’s Overman actualizes the power of élan vital for the creativity of life in regard to the issue of overcoming nihilism, that is to say, to overcome the reactive life, to overcome the closed organism. Here we can find that the revival of Bergson’s élan vital also has an ethical concern which consists of an ethical imperative against nihilism as the negative power and as the dogmatic image of thought by its creative and resisting force.
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